Ferrari’s Sainz strategy wasn’t so bizarre after all, French GP data shows

It meant that Red Bull was unable to pincer Leclerc into a strategic cul-de-sac, making it a straight fight between Verstappen and Leclerc at the front.

The initial tight trace between both drivers shows how closely matched they were, with the Red Bull’s straightline speed advantage making up for Ferrari’s pace in the corners.

But the gap between Leclerc and Verstappen begins to widen at around lap 13 as running in the dirty air hampered the Red Bull driver.

With Perez out of play, the team couldn’t pressure Leclerc with a split strategy so pitted Verstappen first with a view to capitalising on the undercut.

Ferrari and Leclerc opted to stay out, and the continued pace justified that decision, despite Leclerc’s tyres starting to blister. But then it was all over.

Driver error was the confirmed cause of Leclerc’s spin into the wall, but the story isn’t as simple as that. With Ferrari’s recent history of engine woes, the team came into this weekend being cautious. Its conservative engine mode was matched with a more-aggressive setup, with the aim of using trimmed downforce to reduce Red Bull’s top speed advantage.

But the extreme set-up altered the car’s balance. Typically it’s the front, not rear, tyres that bear the brunt and become vulnerable at a circuit such as France. But instead of the conventional understeer, it was at the rear where Leclerc faced issues. And ultimately it was the lively rear end that undid Leclerc’s efforts at the weekend.

At the same time, Hamilton’s unwitting role as Leclerc’s support driver had ended, and he continued his race to consolidate P2. Hamilton did an exceptional job to manage the pace in such a way that Perez was rarely ever a threat, as shown in Chart 1. The gap between the two drivers was stable for most of the race – with Perez being the one to struggle on tyres and keep the pace alive.

Chart 2: Trend pace, Sainz vs Perez

While the order at the front was stabilising, Sainz was making steady work of the traffic in front; the opportune safety car triggered by Leclerc’s crash bringing him up to the rest of the pack and enabling an efficient switch to fresh tyres.

Chart 2 shows Sainz’s stellar pace compared to the Mercedes duo and Red Bull of Sergio Perez. With the gap closed up, it was not long before Sainz was making short work of the drivers ahead, as can be clearly seen in Chart 1.

But Sainz was in a quandary. Having started the race on the hard tyre, he was now on the mediums, trying to make it to the end against the rest of the field on hard tyres. We arrived at the predictable fork in the road of: 2 stop vs 1 stop strategy. History will show that Ferrari opted for the 2-stop. But was it the right call?

Chart 2 provides some insight into whether Ferrari made the right decision. We can see that Sainz’s trend pace begins to deteriorate and crosses over with Perez’s around lap 37/38. Part of this would come down to being affected by the traffic and dirty air of the car in front.

But Sainz had been experiencing a steady decline in trend performance. Compare this to Hamilton, riding in clean air and on more durable tyres, and it was reasonable to expect an increased drop off in performance.

It was also at this time that Sainz was challenging for a spot on the podium – see Chart 1. But was it reasonable to consider that Sainz could hold onto P3? There was a chance, but there was also the chance that he would fall back into the clutches of Perez and Russell behind or worse – have a tyre issue or incident that takes him out of the race.

Pitting for a new set of tyres therefore neturalized this threat and helped consolidate a safer P5 finish.

But why wait so long to pit? Why not pit at the point in which the performance of the stints crossed over? Closer to lap 37?

Chart 3: Sainz’s Pit Window

Chart 3 plots Sainz’s estimated pit window (accounting for the additional 5-second penalty for an unsafe release). This line shows that the issue with pitting earlier was running into the traffic of backmarkers. So even though Sainz was losing pace on the older tyres, it was likely a better outcome than losing more pace behind backmarker traffic and needing to burn out his fresher tyres trying to make his way through the field.

Ultimately Ferrari had to pick the lesser of two evils when it came to managing Sainz’s strategy.

However, the point could still be made that the risky P5 with a chance of a P3/4 is worth the dice roll compared to a safer P5.

Turning to the battle between Russell and Perez, both drivers were there or thereabouts when it came to pace as shown in Chart 2 earlier.

Perez’s inability to clear Hamilton earlier in the race left him vulnerable to the other Mercedes. Despite having the poorer top speed, Russell was able to stay with Perez and sacrificed some pace earlier in the second stint to have a better chance at attacking later on.

While Russell struggled to convert the move in normal circumstances, he was able to play the VSC to his advantage.

Chart 4: Russell’s Overtake at the VSC Restart

The VSC ended between Turns 12 and 13 on lap 50. At this time, Russell was building his throttle and speed, while Perez was the opposite – off the throttle and delayed in building up the speed.

This change in momentum left him vulnerable for Russell to have the advantage going into the final corner and holding on to the position.

But there was a miscommunication to drivers over when the virtual safety car would end. This can be seen in the difference in speed management between Russell and Perez. Perez was caught out by this – he went early, but had to slow down to restore the delta to an appropriate level. As the Mexican was re-establishing his bearings, Russell stayed focused on finding the opportunity at the true end of the VSC.

That gave him the chance to overtake. Russell did well to hold on and bring Mercedes a double podium finish.

It was a trademark display from the Silver Arrows, which displayed the confidence and good judgement that has won the team eight constructors’ titles in a row.

Red Bull is carrying itself in the same way at the moment: Verstappen gave Leclerc little margin for error and then cruised comfortably to victory.

Faced with this, Leclerc and Ferrari have it all to do in the title race, taking uncomfortable risks and compromised positions, while Red Bull continue to operate in its comfort zone.

Although Perez underperformed, it was of little consequence while an error from Leclerc proved catastrophic. Was Leclerc’s mistake in part due to making efforts to compensate for the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the car?

It is a reminder that this sport is a union of man and machine – a union of the driver and the team. And right now, the Verstappen/Red Bull combination is more hooked up than the Leclerc/Ferrari one.

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